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Abstract The purpose of this article is to present an
engineering method for the determination of cause by the
identification of defects that lead to failure. Further dis-
cussion on this topic is of course warranted and this article
is anticipated to catalyze such discussions. In order to
facilitate the development and presentation of this cause
determination method, the definition of defect as it relates
to failure is first presented. While not all failures are the
result of defects (and not all defects result in failures),
identification of a defect may point to opportunities to
prevent recurrence and assist in the determination of cause.
Furthermore, use of this method also serves to identify
causes of failure that are not attributable just to the actions
of responsible parties: such as wear and tear, acts of nature,
and the unknown. Once the cause is identified, the reso-
lution, recovery, and recurrence prevention process then
has the opportunity to move forward. To further demon-
strate application of the cause determination method
presented here, case studies of failures are provided.
Keywords Failure analysis  Cause determination 
Defect identification  Hazard  Risk  Controlled hazard
Introduction
When consideration is given to the cause of a failure (with
consequent loss in the form of property damage or personal
injury), two primary aspects are at issue; reasonable pre-
ventability of the failure, and responsibility. A related
aspect to preventability is whether or not information that
comes to light as a result of analyzing the failure will make
prevention of recurrence of the failure mode practical: That
is, a determination of reasonable means to prevent such
failure.
The approach of this article is to apply the perspective of
the engineer to the question of cause determination. As
such this article is intended to facilitate the work of engi-
neers in fulfilling their primary responsibility to ‘‘Hold
paramount the safety, health, and welfare of the public
[1].’’
A determination that a failure was preventable by rea-
sonable means implies that some lack of reasonableness
was present prior to the failure. However, it is important to
note that reasonable means available after a failure has
taken place may not have been available before the failure
took place. That is, the occurrence of a failure may of itself
bring to light unanticipated information that now allows
reasonable preventative steps to be taken.
While much more can be said on this topic, the purpose
of this article is to present an engineering method for the
determination of cause by the identification of defects that
lead to failure. The work of Charles O. Smith on product
liability and design, published in the ASM Handbook 11
Failure Analysis and Prevention, is of particular pertinence
to this discussion [2]. Further discussion on this topic is of
course warranted and this article is anticipated to catalyze
such discussions. In order to facilitate the development and
presentation of this cause determination method, the defi-
nition of defect as it relates to failure is first presented.
While not all failures are the result of defects (and not all
defects result in failures), identification of a defect may
point to opportunities to prevent recurrence and assist in
the determination of cause. Furthermore, use of this
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method also serves to identify causes of failure that are not
attributable just to the actions of responsible parties: such
as wear and tear, acts of nature, and the unknown. Once the
cause is identified, the resolution, recovery, and recurrence
prevention process then has the opportunity to move for-
ward. To further demonstrate application of the cause
determination method presented here, case studies of fail-
ures are provided.
Definition of Defect
In common usage defect may be defined as ‘‘an imper-
fection that impairs worth or utility’’ or ‘‘a lack of
something necessary for completeness, adequacy, or per-
fection [3].’’ A legal definition of defect is ‘‘an
imperfection or shortcoming, especially in a part that is
essential to the operation or safety of a product [4].’’
However, from an engineering perspective as related to
failure analysis and cause determination, it is useful to
define a defect as an identified deviation from reasonable
efforts to prevent a failure or to mitigate the severity of a
failure. Thus, it is the lack of reasonableness that is the key
for the engineer in identifying the defect. Furthermore,
using lack of reasonableness in identifying defects will
serve to go beyond the frequently applied superficial
(wrong) analyses that assert that the occurrence of a failure
is prima facie evidence that there was a defect. The defect
is the lack of reasonableness that existed prior to the failure
and that resulted in the circumstances that led to the failure.
However, it should be noted that a defect can exist that is
not causal. As discussed later in this article, the defect (or
lack of reasonableness) must have resulted in the failure to
then allow the engineer to assert that the responsible person
or entity caused the failure. Defect identification then
allows the engineer to proceed with efforts to protect the
public. In this regard, the following working definitions are
set forth:
Hazard a condition or situation that can result in
property damage, personal injury, or death.
Risk the probability that a hazard will become manifest.
Controlled Hazard a hazard for which all reasonable
steps have been taken to minimize the risk associated
with the hazard (and for which no unreasonable steps
have been taken that increase the risk associated with the
hazard).
Defect an uncontrolled hazard that is a lack of reasonable
steps or a presence of unreasonable steps.
It should be acknowledged that, with respect to the concept
of defect, another recognized definition of a defect is
focused on physical aspects of a given component that was
involved in a failure. For example, the ASM Materials
Engineering Dictionary defines a defect as: ‘‘(1) A dis-
continuity whose size, shape, orientation, or location makes
it detrimental to the useful service of the part in which it
occurs. (2) A discontinuity or discontinuities which by
nature or accumulated effect (for example, total crack
length) renders a part or product unable to meet minimum
applicable acceptance standards or specifications. This
term designates rejectability [5].’’ In the ASM Handbook
Volume 11, defect is defined as: ‘‘(1) An imperfection
(deviation from perfection) that can be shown to cause
failure by quantitative analysis and that would not have
occurred in the absence of the imperfection [6].’’ In this
situation one might say that there was a defect in a shaft
that led to crack propagation and fracture of the shaft. This
focused definition of defect is also valid and useful for
describing the physical aspects that resulted in a failure. As
such the question that is answered is, ‘‘What happened?’’
However, in another section of the ASM Handbook Vol-
ume 11 dealing with products liability and design, the
above definition of defect is but one of several types of
defect that an engineer who engages in failure analysis
should consider [7]. Other defect types to be considered
include manufacturing defects, design defects, marketing
defects, etc. Thus, it is seen that a failure can result from a
defect that is other than some physical aspect of the com-
ponent involved in a failure. By defining defect in the way
that is set forth above, that is ‘‘an uncontrolled hazard (with
the associated lack of reasonableness),’’ two benefits are
realized. First, defects other than physical defects are
included and may be considered as a part of the analysis.
Second, there is the further opportunity to address what
caused the loss. The question that is answered is, ‘‘Why did
it happen?’’
Determination of Cause Method
The cause of a failure may be categorized as one of four
distinct types:
1. Wear and tear.
2. Unknown.
3. Actions of a person, persons, entity, or entities.
4. Act of natural world (sometimes referred to as an act of
God).
When a hazard manifests in the form of a failure, the
method presented herein offers a process for determining
the cause of the failure. This method, however, is intended
as a guide rather than an exclusive method. Furthermore, at
the end of the analysis, the engineer investigating the
failure is expected to exercise to judgment as to the
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reasonableness of the conclusions derived from the appli-
cation of the method. The object here is to present a basic
path of investigation.
A graphical representation of this method for determi-
nation of cause is shown in Fig. 1. At each decision point
in the diagram, application of the scientific method is
required. Given that the situation is analysis of a failure
after it has taken place, the scientific method will proceed
by making observations, applying inductive reasoning to
formulate hypotheses as to how the observed conditions
could have come about, utilizing the process of elimination
(part of both inductive and deductive reasoning) to test and
reject hypotheses, and then using abductive reasoning to
reach a conclusion from among the hypotheses that were
not rejected. Use of reference materials, experiments, and
analytical techniques of engineering are expected.
Referencing Fig. 1, Decision Point D1 poses the ques-
tion ‘‘Is the loss/damage/injury consistent with reasonable
care and use over a period of time of the involved
object(s)?’’ A yes answer to this question will lead to Cause
C1: wear and tear. An example that would fall into this
category is automobile tires that exhibit uniform wear
consistent with use of the tires. Another example would be
weathering to the exterior of a building that is consistent
with the age of the building. In both instances, signs of
abuse would not be observed and indication of proper
maintenance would be confirmed. A no answer to the
question then leads to Decision Point D2.
Decision Point D2 poses the question ‘‘Are the hazards
that resulted in the loss/damage/injury able to be identi-
fied?’’ A no answer at this point will lead to Cause C2:
unknown. An example that would fall into this category
might be a piece of electronic equipment that cannot be
tested since it is not functioning and where the history of
the equipment is not known. A yes answer then leads to the
Decision Point D3.
Decision Point D3 poses a compound question - the
central point of which is to assess whether or not the
actions leading up to the failure were reasonable. Lack of
reasonableness may be manifest either in the absence of a
reasonable act or in the presence of an unreasonable act. To
wit: were reasonable steps taken to minimize the risk due to
the identified hazard(s) and were there no unreasonable
steps taken that would have increased the risk from the
hazard? A no answer asserts an identifiable unreasonable-
ness and will lead to Cause C3a, a defect due to actions of a
person or entity.1 An example of a lack of reasonable steps
would be a contractor who dug a hole at a construction site
but did not put up barriers or markers to prevent someone
from falling into the hole. An example of the presence of
unreasonable steps would be a modification to a machine or
process operating system that exposes operating personnel
to injury. A yes answer leads to Decision Point D4.
Decision Point D4 (and also Decision Point D2 dis-
cussed earlier) recognizes that, unsatisfying as it may be,
there are times when the information available is insuffi-
cient to identify a cause and therefore leads us to Cause C2:
unknown. Decision Point D4 poses the question ‘‘Was the
loss due to identified hazards that exceeded the control
provided by reasonable steps taken?’’ Consider a building
damaged by a fire in which the fire damage is great enough
that the pre-fire conditions could not be established, the
origin of the fire could not be determined, and for which
the pre-fire history of the building is not known. Whether
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Fig. 1 Overview of method
1 The ‘‘person or entity’’ cause is separated into two categories to
acknowledge the fact that a person or entity can be responsible for a
loss incident even when a defect does not exist.
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or not the controls were exceeded cannot be assessed and a
no answer is required. Another example would be a code-
compliant building that has sustained wind damage from
winds that were less than the design and construction of the
building should have allowed the building to withstand.2
No deficiencies of materials, workmanship, or design are
identified. In this case, adequate controls for the identified
hazard (wind) were in place, but damage was sustained
nevertheless. Either there was another unknown hazard
(different from the identified wind load hazard) that
resulted in the loss or some aspect of the history of the
building created a deficiency that is not able to be identi-
fied. Regardless, there would be a no answer which leads to
Cause C2: unknown. Another example leading to a no
answer here would be a fractured part where design, choice
of materials, and installation are known and confirmed, but
where the service use history is not known.
Further consideration of Decision Point D4 leads to the
alternative in which the controls for the identified hazard
are known to have been exceeded. A yes answer would
lead to Decision Point D5. An example here would be a
500-year flood (hazard) that ruptured (damaged) a dam
built to withstand a 100-year flood. Another example
would be a consumer product that was manufactured
according to the best knowledge and practices at the time
of manufacture that later injured a user due to some pre-
viously unrecognized hazard. The protections provided by
the control were exceeded by the hazard.
Recall that in order to reach this point in the analysis, it
has been established that the actions leading up to the
failure were reasonable and that the controls that the rea-
sonable actions put in place were exceeded by the hazard.
Further, note that the example hazards presented in con-
sideration of Decision Point D4 included a hazard of
natural origin (the 500-year flood) and a hazard of human
origin (injury from a manufactured product). Decision
Point D5 seeks to differentiate between human-created
hazards and natural hazards and, therefore, poses the
question ‘‘Was the hazard that resulted in the damage due
to a human-created hazard?’’ A no answer will lead to
Cause C4: Act of the Natural World. A yes answer leads to
Decision Point D6.
Arriving at this point in the analysis, if the hazard is now
recognizable due to information brought to light by the
failure, then a judgment may be made as to the reason-
ableness of the hazard. Given the information that exists
due to the fact that the failure has taken place, Decision
Point D6 then poses the question ‘‘Were the conditions
prior to the loss unreasonably hazardous?’’ A yes answer
will lead to cause C3a: a defect due to actions of a person
or entity. In a case such as this, even though due care was
exercised and appropriate reasonable steps were taken to
prevent loss from the hazard (based upon the information
and practices available at the time), the loss still occurred
as a result of a hazard that was not controlled. Further a
person or entity was involved.
This example defines a special case of assigning
responsibility (i.e., assigning cause) that was ultimately
defined into case law in the USA. The legal term that
applies is ‘‘strict liability [8],’’ a concept that needs to be
recognized and appreciated by the engineer. Referencing
step D2 in Fig. 1, the hazard that resulted in the loss could
not have been known in advance. The answer at this step is
no. However, under the theory of strict liability, the cause,
rather than unknown, is attributed to a person or an entity
under Cause C3a: defect due to action of person or entity.
Two examples here will suffice to explain. A first example
would be a company creates a product which after the fact
is identified as defective (without a prior knowledge of the
hazardous condition). The product later results in a loss or
injury. Only then is the product identified as defective and
only then is there recognition of steps that could have been
taken to control the hazardous condition of the product. A
product, therefore, can be deemed defective even though
the manufacturer had taken reasonable care in its produc-
tion and there is no record of abuse. A second example
would be a premature service-related fracture of an axle on
machine part or on a vehicle. The design and manufac-
turing record confirms that all reasonable steps were taken
to avoid premature fracture. The vehicle was not misused.
Analysis determines that the fracture was due to a latent
manufacturing deficiency in the material, present in spite of
the record of design, manufacture, and care.
Alternatively, if the utility of an object is inseparable
from a hazard and a benefit is derived from use of the
object, then the object has an inherent hazard that is rea-
sonable and the risk from the inherent hazard is borne by a
person or entity. The answer to the question at Decision
Point D6 is no. While in this instance there is no defect,
because there is a benefit derived from an inherent hazard
the risk is borne by person or entity which leads to Cause
C3b: actions of a person or entity. Objects whose basic
function is not separable from some hazardous feature
would be deemed reasonably hazardous. A sharp knife
would be a recognizable example that falls into this cate-
gory. Flammable fuel for automobiles would be another.
Thoughts as to Putting the Method into Practice
Use of this method often leads to a well-defined single
cause for a failure. However, in some instances the cause of
a failure is attributable to a combination of underlying
2 In this example the engineer will need to consider whether the code
requirements are performance driven or proscriptive.
J Fail. Anal. and Preven. (2017) 17:8–14 11
123
factors. That is, there may be more than one cause. For
example, a product which is unreasonably hazardous may
be used by someone in a way that is also unreasonable - the
combination of which conditions results in an injury.
Elimination of either the unreasonable hazard or the
unreasonable use would have prevented the failure. Thus, it
is incumbent upon the engineer in conducting the analysis
to determine whether multiple factors were present.
Case Study 1: Rupture of a Pressure Vessel: Improper
Maintenance
This incident concerns the rupture of a steam accumulator
that was part of a steam-generating facility with consequent
damage to a facility [9]. On a normal working day while
being operated at its typical working pressure of 120 psi,
the pressurized vessel ruptured without warning. The weld
that connected the bottom head section of the pressure
vessel to the main shell section had fractured separating the
bottom head of the vessel from the shell. Manufacture of
this pressure vessel falls under Section VIII, Division 1 of
the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code. It had been
designed for a maximum working pressure of 150 psi. An
appropriate steel had been used for the manufacture of the
pressure vessel. The code specifies that a hydrostatic test
pressure of 225 psi be applied to the pressure vessel at the
time of manufacture.
A review of the history of the pressure vessel revealed a
drain coupling on the bottom of the pressure vessel had
been repaired a few years prior to the incident. Repairs
were carried out in accordance with the National Board
Inspection Code (the NBIC), with a hydrostatic pressure
test at 120 psi.
Eighteen months prior to the incident, a small leak was
detected at a crack in the weld that connected the bottom
head to the shell of the pressure vessel. Repair work was
undertaken by welding the crack. The vessel was not
subjected to a hydrostatic test prior to being placed back
into service.
Examination of the fracture surfaces subsequent to the
incident revealed that a crack (present since the time of
original manufacture) had grown due to cyclic loading
while the pressure vessel was in service, resulting in the
rupture. The precise size of the crack at the time of man-
ufacture could not be determined. However, the pressure
vessel did pass the ASME code required hydrostatic testing
conducted at the time of manufacture.
The leak that precipitated the repair work was deter-
mined to be from a crack in the weld that connected the
bottom head to the shell of the pressure vessel that had
been present from the time of original manufacture. The
size of the crack, however, was not of such an extent that
precluded passing hydrostatic tests both at original manu-
facture and after replacement of the drain coupling.
Returning now the repair of the crack location where the
vessel was found to be leaking. Repair of such cracks is
governed by the NBIC which requires the crack be
removed as a part of the repair process. Post-loss exami-
nation demonstrated that, in fact, the crack was not
removed as a part of the repair. The requirements of the
NBIC were not fulfilled. As the pressure vessel continued
in service, the crack continued to grow.
The crack that had manifested as a leak 18 months prior
to the rupture, consistent with the ‘‘leak before rupture (or
break)’’ design philosophy appropriate for pressure vessels
[10]. The severity of this earlier condition was modest (a
release of steam with limited potential for injury or addi-
tional property damage). Repair of this crack created
conditions that resulted in a ‘‘rupture before leak’’ with
consequent greater severity (property damage and personal
injury).
The flow chart in Fig. 1 is repeated as Fig. 2 to illustrate
application of the method to this case. At Decision Point
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Fig. 2 Application of method to rupture of pressure vessel
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vessels are not expected to rupture as a natural course of
their use. Cause C1 was eliminated. Move to Decision
Point D2. At Decision Point D2, the rupture of the pressure
vessel is identified as the hazard that resulted in the prop-
erty damage. Move to Decision Point D3. At Decision
Point D3, a defect is identified due to the presence of an
unreasonable act attributable to the repair facility involved
(repair work not done in accordance with the requirements
of NBIC). Cause C3a is affirmed.
Case Study 2: Vehicle Fires: Reasonable Steps Taken at
Time of Manufacture: Hazard Not Recognized Until
After the Hazard Had Become Manifest
Fire science teaches that in order for a fire to start three
things must be brought together in the right combination to
enable an uninhibited chemical reaction: a competent
ignition source, an ignitable fuel, and oxygen (or an oxi-
dizer). Unintended fires are prevented by keeping this
combination from being brought together. In the context of
the design and manufacture of internal-combustion engine
powered vehicles, ignition sources, ignitable fuels, and
oxygen are present throughout the vehicle. The prevention
of fires is accomplished by preventing an ignitable combi-
nation from coming together.
Partial list of ignition sources in the form of heat sour-
ces/hot objects includes:
Wiring faults in the engine compartment.





Friction from locked-up accessory drive pulleys.
Wheel bearing deprived of required lubrication.
Underinflated tires.
Dragging brakes.
Partial list of ignitable materials includes:
Fuel (gasoline, diesel, propane, natural gas).
Miscellaneous plastic components within the engine
compartment.
Upholstery in the passenger compartment (these are
often fire resistant but not fire proof – i.e., they will burn
if flame is supported by another fuel).
Foreign objects/debris that has accumulated in the
vehicle (grass, objects from the road, animals impacted
while in motion or building nests, etc.)
This incident concerns a vehicle designed with an appro-
priate diesel fuel-handling system within the engine
compartment. The hoses, connectors, diesel fuel pump, and
storage tanks were selected with care. Also, the long-term
wear properties of the components and the service envi-
ronment were considered. The design took reasonable
precautions for the hazards that were identified. Further,
the manufacturing process for the assembly of the engine
and its subsequent installation in the vehicle addressed
issues associated with preventing an unintended fire from
being started. However, in specifying the manufacturing
process for workers to install the diesel fuel lines, a clamp
that attached a hose in the engine compartment needed to
be oriented such that a raised portion of the clamp would
not rub on an adjoining hose that carried diesel fuel.
Instructions were provided for the workers regarding the
installation of the bracket and its clamp. Manufacturing test
runs were performed. For workers who utilized their right
hand to install the clamp, the needed clamp orientation was
comfortable. However, for workers who utilized their left
hand, a different (more comfortable) orientation for
installing the clamp resulted in the raised portion of the
clamp being in proximity to the adjoining diesel fuel hose.
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Fig. 3 Application of method to vehicle fire
J Fail. Anal. and Preven. (2017) 17:8–14 13
123
would vibrate and come into contact with the raised portion
of these clamps on an intermittent basis. Over time, a hole
was worn in the diesel fuel line. Fuel was released onto the
vehicles exhaust manifold with a consequent fire.
After conducting investigations of fires that took place
in these vehicles, the manufacturer determined that a dif-
ferent style of clamp, with no raised area that could rub on
the adjoining diesel fuel line, could be utilized. However,
prior to what was now an appreciation of the hazardous
condition presented by the original diesel fuel hose clamp,
the step of utilizing the alternative clamp was not recog-
nized. Once the hazard of a fire in the vehicles as a result of
the use of the original clamp was recognized, it was then
realized that a reasonable means was available to minimize
the risk of the fire hazard.
The flow chart in Fig. 1 is repeated as Fig. 3 to illustrate
application of the cause method to this case. The fires were
not a result of wear and tear – Decision Point D1. Vehicles
are not expected to catch on fire as a natural course of their
use. Cause C1 was eliminated. Move to Decision Point D2.
At Decision Point D2 the hazard of a vehicle fire is iden-
tified. Move to Decision Point D3. At Decision Point D3,
reasonable steps were taken and no unreasonable steps
were taken with respect to the hazard of a fire. Move to
Decision Point D4. At Decision Point D4 it is determined
that the controls put in place for the identified hazard were
exceeded. Move to Decision Point D5. It is evident that,
despite reasonable actions have been taken, there was a
vehicle fire due to a human-created hazard. Move to
Decision Point D6. The hazard is deemed to be unreason-
able as it may be prevented by reasonable means. Cause
C3a is affirmed.
Conclusions
A determination of cause method, intended to assist the
engineer in the investigation of failure, has been presented
along with two example cases. Further, a definition of
defect has been proposed to facilitate the investigation of
failure. The engineering judgment in the application of the
method and the definition of defect hinge upon a qualified
assessment of what is reasonable and what is unreasonable.
Reasonableness is the core of the work of the engineers in
their efforts to protect the public. As noted at the onset of
this paper, the results of the engineer’s analysis are useful
in addressing the question of loss resolution, recovery, and
compensation.
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